期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SMART GRID
卷 11, 期 4, 页码 3119-3130出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2020.2965221
关键词
Privacy; Real-time systems; Pricing; Resource management; Load management; Smart grids; Energy consumption; Demand response; auction; flexibility; mechanism design; blockchain; incentive compatibility; game theory
资金
- European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme through FLEXGRID Project [863876]
High penetration of Renewable Energy Sources in modern smart grids necessitates the development of Demand Response (DR) mechanisms as well as corresponding innovative services for the emerging flexibility markets. From a game-theoretic perspective, the key requirements for a DR mechanism are: efficiency in terms of social welfare, practical applicability, scalability, privacy and incentive compatibility, in the sense of making it a dominant strategy for each user to act truthfully according to his/her real preferences, leaving no room for cheating. Previous works typically address only a subgroup of these requirements. In this paper, we propose a DR architecture, including a mechanism based on Ausubel's clinching auction and a communication protocol, that provably guarantee both efficiency and truthful user participation. Practicality/easiness of participation is enhanced via simple queries, while scalability and user privacy are preserved via a distributed implementation. Simulation results confirm the desired properties, while also showing that the truthfulness property becomes even more important in markets where participants are not particularly flexible.
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