期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
卷 35, 期 3, 页码 1729-1740出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2019.2957537
关键词
Games; Load modeling; Transactive energy; Power generation; Resource management; Game theory; Numerical models; Coalitional game model; Energy management; Local energy community
资金
- National Key Research and Development Program of China [2017YFB0903000]
This paper focuses on transactive energy management in local energy communities and proposes a coalitional game model which considers the presence and utilization of flexible loads and the power output uncertainties from renewable energy sources. The superadditivity and balancedness of the proposed game model are proved rigorously by demonstrating that a nucleolus-based solution leads to a stable and fair payoff distribution scheme for all players. More specifically, the objective function is proved concave with its analytical expression, derived through an approximated piecewise linear function. The proposed allocation of realized payoffs is then proved to converge consistently to a nucleolus-based solution. It is demonstrated by numerical simulations that the grand coalition effectively increases the global payoff and the proposed allocation scheme contributes to peak shaving and valley filling in the overall load profile.
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