期刊
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL
卷 6, 期 6, 页码 10936-10940出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2019.2934947
关键词
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT); insider attack; key establishment; perfect forward secrecy; secret key expose; stolen smart device; stolen verifier attack
Very recently, Das et al. (IEEE Internet of Things Journal, pp. 4900-4913, 5(6), DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2018.2877690, 2018) presented a biometric-based solution for security and privacy in Industrial Internet of Things architecture. Das et al. claimed that their protocol is secure against known attacks. However, this comment shows that their protocol is defenseless against stolen verifier, stolen smart device, and traceability attacks. The attacker having access to public parameters and any of the verifier and parameters stored in smart device can easily expose the session key shared among the user and the smart device. Moreover, their protocol fails to provide perfect forward secrecy. Finally, this article also provides some necessary guidelines on attack resilience for the authentication schemes based on merely the symmetric key primitives, which are overlooked by Das et al.
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