期刊
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES
卷 24, 期 2, 页码 101-111出版社
CELL PRESS
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2019.12.001
关键词
-
资金
- John Templeton Foundation
People's beliefs about others are often impervious to new evidence: we continue to cooperate with ingroup defectors and refuse to see outgroup enemies as rehabilitated. Resistance to updating beliefs with new information has historically been interpreted as reflecting bias or motivated cognition, but recent work in Bayesian inference suggests that belief maintenance can be compatible with procedural rationality. We propose a mentalizing account of belief maintenance, which holds that protecting strong priors by generating alternative explanations for surprising information involves more mentalizing about the target than nonrational discounting. We review the neuroscientific evidence supporting this approach, and discuss how both types of processing can lead to fitness benefits.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据