No commitment to the truth

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this article is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position.

Automated summary

This article discusses the normativity of epistemic rationality and the view of epistemic teleology, arguing that we have the right to believe rational propositions, but not necessarily should do so. The author's epistemic teleological position suggests that we do not necessarily have to strive for truth.