Against 'functional gravitational energy': a critical note on functionalism, selective realism, and geometric objects and gravitational energy

The present paper revisits the debate between realists about gravitational energy in GR (who opine that gravitational energy can be said to meaningfully exist in GR) and anti-realists/eliminativists (who deny this). I re-assess the arguments underpinning Hoefer's seminal eliminativist stance, and those of their realist detractors' responses. A more circumspect reading of the former is proffered that discloses where the so far not fully appreciated,realchallenges lie for realism about gravitational energy. I subsequently turn to Lam and Read's recent proposals for such a realism. Their arguments are critically examined. Special attention is devoted to the adequacy of Read's appeals to functionalism, imported from the philosophy of mind.

Automated summary

This paper revisits the debate between realists and anti-realists regarding gravitational energy in general relativity, reassessing the arguments of eliminativists and realist detractors. It also examines recent proposals for realism by Lam and Read, with a particular focus on the adequacy of functionalism introduced from philosophy of mind.