Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose

Suppose that I hold a ticket in a fair lottery and that I believe that my ticket will lose [L] on the basis of its extremely high probability of losing. What is the appropriate epistemic appraisal of me and my belief that L? Am I justified in believing that L? Do I know that L? While there is disagreement among epistemologists over whether or not I am justified in believing that L, there is widespread agreement that I do not know that L. I defend the two-pronged view that I am justified in believing that my ticket will lose and that I know that it will lose. Along the way, I discuss four different but related versions of the lottery paradox-The Paradox for Rationality, The Paradox for Knowledge, The Paradox for Fallibilism, and The Paradox for Epistemic Closure-and offer a unified resolution of each of them.

Automated summary

The article discusses the paradox of fair lotteries, examining whether one is justified in believing their ticket will lose and whether they know it will lose. The author defends a position that one is justified in believing and knows their ticket will lose. Four different versions of the lottery paradox are discussed and a unified resolution is offered for each.