4.6 Article

A game theoretic analysis of resource mining in blockchain

出版社

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10586-020-03046-w

关键词

Blockchain; Bitcoin mining; Dynamic game theory; Differential game; Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation; Social optimum; Nash equilibrium; Myopic Nash equilibrium; Pigovian tax

资金

  1. University of Waterloo, Canada [2016/21/B/HS4/00695]
  2. National Science Centre, Poland

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today's digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a single miner or a mining pool, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.6
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据