期刊
APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION
卷 362, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2019.06.007
关键词
Cooperation; Evolutionary games; Popularity; Network reciprocity; Social dilemmas
The popularity of each individual in a realistic social system adaptively changes within a population. In this paper, we propose the coevolution of popularity and strategy and explore potential reasons that how this setup affects the evolution of cooperation in structured population. The popularity of each individual is defined as a function of parameter alpha and vertex weight that evolves by delta overtime. Through simulation, we find that our mechanism enables the survival of cooperation when b is relatively large. For the above results, we provide a detailed explanation through systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. Our conclusion provides an insight for understanding cooperation in social systems. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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