4.6 Article

Strengthening the exclusion argument

期刊

SYNTHESE
卷 198, 期 7, 页码 6631-6659

出版社

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02481-6

关键词

Causal exclusion; Functionalism; Mental causation; Physicalism; Reductionism

向作者/读者索取更多资源

By focusing on functionalist varieties of nonreductivism, a revised version of the causal exclusion argument has been developed with several advantages over the original. The revised argument does not rely on Kim's causal exclusion principle, is adaptable to different conceptions of causation, and does not have the objectionable consequence of labeling all higher-level properties as epiphenomenal.
As conceived by Kim, the causal exclusion argument targets all forms of nonreductive physicalism equally, but by restricting its focus to functionalist varieties of nonreductivism, I am able to develop a version of the argument that has a number of virtues lacking in the original. First, the revised argument has no need for Kim's causal exclusion principle, which many find dubious if not simply false. Second, the revised argument can be adapted to either a production-based conception of causation, as Kim himself favors, or to any of a number of dependence-based conceptions, like the ones favored by many of Kim's critics. And, finally, the revised argument does not have the objectionable consequence that all so-called higher-level properties are epiphenomenal, for it does not generalize in the way that Kim's original version of the argument arguably does. Nor does it concede much to narrow the scope of the argument in the way proposed. Those who adopt nonreductive theories of mind do so, by and large, on the strength of functionalist arguments for the multiple realizability of mental states. If functionalism entails that mental properties are epiphenomenal, this thus deals a critical, if not quite fatal, blow to nonreductivism.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.6
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据