期刊
BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
卷 31, 期 4, 页码 459-482出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10539-016-9528-0
关键词
Statisticalism; Evolutionary genetics; Causal models; Selection; Drift; Fitness
资金
- Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research [16K16335] Funding Source: KAKEN
Over the past decade philosophers of biology have discussed whether evolutionary theory is a causal theory or a phenomenological study of evolution based solely on the statistical features of a population. This article reviews this controversy from three aspects, respectively concerning the assumptions, applications, and explanations of evolutionary theory, with a view to arriving at a definite conclusion in each contention. In so doing I also argue that an implicit methodological assumption shared by both sides of the debate, namely the overconfidence in conceptual analysis as a tool to understand the scientific theory, is the real culprit that has both generated the problem and precluded its solution for such a long time.
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