期刊
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
卷 47, 期 4, 页码 305-310出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2019.04.008
关键词
Direct selling; Information sharing; Signaling; Inference
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71701097, 71772157]
- Hong Kong University Grant Council General Research Fund (GRF), China [PolyU 155012/17B]
- Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China [BK20170777]
Consider a bilateral monopoly selling to a market with uncertain demand. The retailer has access to a demand signal. The supplier can add a direct channel, which grants it market access as well. The supplier and the retailer can acquire signals from each other with payments. We show that direct selling by the supplier improves information flow to realize system-wide information transparency, which has mixed effects on the profits for the retailer and the system. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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