Against the disappearance of spacetime in quantum gravity

This paper argues against the proposal to draw from current research into a physical theory of quantum gravity the ontological conclusion that spacetime or spatiotemporal relations are not fundamental. As things stand, the status of this proposal is like the one of all the other claims about radical changes in ontology that were made during the development of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. However, none of these claims held up to scrutiny as a consequence of the physics once the theory was established and a serious discussion about its ontology had begun. Furthermore, the paper argues that if spacetime is to be recovered through a functionalist procedure in a theory that admits no fundamental spacetime, standard functionalism cannot serve as a model: all the known functional definitions are definitions in terms of a causal role for the motion of physical objects and hence presuppose spatiotemporal relations.

Automated summary

This paper argues against the proposal that spacetime or spatiotemporal relations are not fundamental, pointing out that such claims need rigorous scrutiny in physics. The paper suggests that if spacetime is to be recovered in a theory that denies its fundamental nature, standard functionalism cannot serve as a model in this case.