期刊
TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES
卷 15, 期 3, 页码 104-112出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE LONDON
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.01.001
关键词
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资金
- Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) [MOP 81188]
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
- Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research (MSFHR)
- Fondo National de Desarrollo Cientifico y Tecnologico [1090612]
- Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.
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