期刊
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL
卷 45, 期 10, 页码 1572-1589出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2011.07.011
关键词
Mean field games; Interacting populations; Nash equilibrium; Rational expectations; Flow of pedestrians; Lane formation
类别
资金
- Austrian Science Foundation FWF [T456-N23]
- AL by the Chaire EDF-Credit Agricole CIB-CDC Finance et Developpement Durable-Approches Quantitatives
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [T 456] Funding Source: researchfish
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [T456] Funding Source: Austrian Science Fund (FWF)
In this paper we present a new class of pedestrian crowd models based on the mean field games theory introduced by Lasry and Lions in 2006. This macroscopic approach is based on a microscopic model, that considers smart pedestrians who rationally interact and anticipate the future. This leads to a forward-backward structure in time. We focus on two-population interactions and validate the modeling with simple examples. Two complementary classes of problems are addressed, namely the case of crowd aversion and the one of congestion. In both cases we describe the model and present numerical solvers (based on the optimization formulation and the partial differential equations respectively). Finally we present numerical tests involving anticipation phenomena and complex group behaviors such as lane formation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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