期刊
SIGNAL PROCESSING-IMAGE COMMUNICATION
卷 23, 期 3, 页码 212-223出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.image.2008.01.003
关键词
permutation-only multimedia encryption; image; video; speech; cryptanalysis; known-plaintext attack; chosen-plaintext attack
In recent years secret permutations have been widely used for protecting different types of multimedia data, including speech files, digital images and videos. Based on a general model of permutation-only multimedia ciphers, this paper performs a quantitative cryptanalysis on the performance of these kind of ciphers against plaintext attacks. When the plaintext is of size M x N and with L different levels of values, the following quantitative cryptanalytic findings have been concluded under the assumption of a uniform distribution of each element in the plaintext: (1) all permutation-only multimedia ciphers are practically insecure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks in the sense that only O(log(L)(MN)) known/chosen plaintexts are sufficient to recover not less than (in an average sense) half elements of the plaintext; (2) the computational complexity of the known/chosen-plain text attack is only O(n center dot (MN)(2)), where n is the number of known/chosen plaintexts used. When the plaintext has a non-uniform distribution, the number of required plaintexts and the computational complexity is also discussed. Experiments are given to demonstrate the real performance of the known-plaintext attack for a typical permutation-only image cipher. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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