期刊
SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING
卷 39, 期 5, 页码 1799-1832出版社
SIAM PUBLICATIONS
DOI: 10.1137/08072721X
关键词
network design; cost sharing; price of anarchy; game theory; Nash equilibrium
资金
- NSF [0323766]
- Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship
- ONR
- DARPA [W911NF-05-1-0224]
Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-sharing protocols that induce only network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed graphs and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs.
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