期刊
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
卷 111, 期 -, 页码 10810-10817出版社
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400823111
关键词
Nash equilibrium; evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS); dynamic stability
资金
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- National Science Foundation of China [31270439]
- National Basic Research Program of China (973 Program) [2013CB945000]
The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e. g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games.
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