4.8 Article

Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions

出版社

NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1207992110

关键词

functional MRI; morality; theory of mind

资金

  1. National Institutes of Health [1R01 MH096914-01A1]
  2. Simons Foundation
  3. National Science Foundation [095518]
  4. John Merck Scholars grant
  5. Dana Foundation
  6. National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship [0645960]
  7. Division Of Behavioral and Cognitive Sci
  8. Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie [0955818] Funding Source: National Science Foundation

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e., reasoning about beliefs and intentions), which is supported by a group of brain regions including the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that interfering with activity in RTPJ can impair mental state reasoning for moral judgment and that high-functioning individuals with autism spectrum disorders make moral judgments based less on intent information than neurotypical participants. Three experiments, using multivoxel pattern analysis, find that (i) in neurotypical adults, the RTPJ shows reliable and distinct spatial patterns of responses across voxels for intentional vs. accidental harms, and (ii) individual differences in this neural pattern predict differences in participants' moral judgments. These effects are specific to RTPJ. By contrast, (iii) this distinction was absent in adults with autism spectrum disorders. We conclude that multivoxel pattern analysis can detect features of mental state representations (e. g., intent), and that the corresponding neural patterns are behaviorally and clinically relevant.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.8
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据