期刊
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
卷 109, 期 43, 页码 17372-17376出版社
NATL ACAD SCIENCES
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1208417109
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资金
- Swedish Research Council for the Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning through the program Human Cooperation to Manage Natural Resources
- German Academic Exchange Service
- Centre for European Economic Research
- Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory for Economic Research team at Magdeburg University
How does uncertainty about dangerous climate change affect the prospects for international cooperation? Climate negotiations usually are depicted as a prisoners' dilemma game; collectively, countries are better off reducing their emissions, but self-interest impels them to keep on emitting. We provide experimental evidence, grounded in an analytical framework, showing that the fear of crossing a dangerous threshold can turn climate negotiations into a coordination game, making collective action to avoid a dangerous threshold virtually assured. These results are robust to uncertainty about the impact of crossing a threshold, but uncertainty about the location of the threshold turns the game back into a prisoners' dilemma, causing cooperation to collapse. Our research explains the paradox of why countries would agree to a collective goal, aimed at reducing the risk of catastrophe, but act as if they were blind to this risk.
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