期刊
PHYSICAL REVIEW E
卷 80, 期 1, 页码 -出版社
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.016110
关键词
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资金
- European Commission [IST-034632]
- Swiss National Science Foundation [200020-119719/1]
- Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) [200020-119719] Funding Source: Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF)
We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common behaviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and engage in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game with their neighbors. Two different graphs are studied: rings (one-dimensional lattices with cyclic boundary conditions) and scale-free networks of the Barabasi-Albert type. The proposed evolutionary-graph model is studied both by means of Monte Carlo simulations and an extended pair-approximation technique. We find improved levels of cooperation when evolution is carried on rings and individuals imitate according to both the traditional payoff bias and a conformist bias. More importantly, we show that scale-free networks are no longer powerful amplifiers of cooperation when fair amounts of conformity are introduced in the imitation rules of the players. Such weakening of the cooperation-promoting abilities of scale-free networks is the result of a less biased flow of information in scale-free topologies, making hubs more susceptible of being influenced by less-connected neighbors.
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