期刊
PHYSICAL REVIEW E
卷 80, 期 5, 页码 -出版社
AMER PHYSICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.80.056104
关键词
game theory; graph theory; Monte Carlo methods; phase diagrams; phase transformations
资金
- Hungarian National Research Fund [K-73449]
- Bolyai Research Grant
- Slovenian Research Agency [Z1-9629, Z1-2032-2547]
- Slovene-Hungarian Bilateral Incentive [BI-HU/09-10-001]
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graph defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation, and defection. The simplified payoff matrix is characterized by two parameters: the temptation b to choose defection and the cost c of inspection reducing the income of tit-for-tat. The strategy imitation from one of the neighbors is controlled by pairwise comparison at a fixed level of noise. Using Monte Carlo simulations and the extended versions of pair approximation we have evaluated the b-c phase diagrams indicating a rich plethora of phase transitions between stationary coexistence, absorbing, and oscillatory states, including continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. By reasonable costs the tit-for-tat strategy prevents extinction of cooperators across the whole span of b determining the prisoner's dilemma game, irrespective of the connectivity structure. We also demonstrate that the system can exhibit a repetitive succession of oscillatory and stationary states upon changing a single payoff value, which highlights the remarkable sensitivity of cyclical interactions on the parameters that define the strength of dominance.
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