4.6 Article

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

期刊

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2011.01.004

关键词

Cooperation; Flocks; Evolutionary games; Prisoner's dilemma; Snowdrift game

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61004088]
  2. Key Foundation for Basic Research from Science and Technology Commission of Shanghai [09JC1408000]
  3. Aeronautic Science Foundation of China [20100157001]

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We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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