期刊
OPERATIONS RESEARCH LETTERS
卷 36, 期 3, 页码 381-384出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2007.08.003
关键词
advertising; differential games; oligopoly
We investigate a linear state differential game of advertising, under Cournot and Bertrand competition. A unique saddlepoint equilibrium exists if the marginal cost of advertising is sufficiently low. Bertrand competition entails more intense advertising than Cournot competition, since increasing market size is more important to firms when competition is tough. (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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