期刊
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 41, 期 4, 页码 752-765出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2012.09.004
关键词
Perishable product; Supply chain management; Multiple-party coordination; Third-party logistics; Coordination contracts
资金
- Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [410509]
- Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program [20101081741]
- National Natural Science Foundation of China under Research Fund [70890082, 71232007, 71071083, 71222102, 71171105]
- MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities [11JJD630004]
We consider a supply chain in which a producer supplies a fresh product, through a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, to a distant market where a distributor purchases and sells it to end customers. The product is perishable, both the quantity and quality of which may deteriorate during the process of transportation. The market demand is random, sensitive to the selling price as well as the freshness of the product. We derive the optimal decisions for the three supply chain members, including the 3PL provider's transportation fee, the producer's shipping quantity and wholesale price, and the distributor's purchasing quantity and retail price. We find that the presence of the 3PL provider in the supply chain has a significant impact on its performance. We propose an incentive scheme to coordinate the supply chain. The scheme consists of two contracts, including a wholesale-market clearance (WMC) contract between the producer and the distributor, and a wholesale-price-discount sharing (WDS) contract between the producer and the 3PL provider. We show that the proposed contracts can eliminate the two sources of double marginalization that exist in the three-tier supply chain, and induce the three parties to act in a coordinated way. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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