期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 251, 期 4, 页码 698-707出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.01.005
关键词
evolutionary game theory; evolutionary graph theory; ESS; structured population; spatial games
资金
- NIGMS NIH HHS [R01GM078986, R01 GM078986, R01 GM078986-02] Funding Source: Medline
Evolutionary stability is a fundamental concept in evolutionary game theory. A strategy is called an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if its monomorphic population rejects the invasion of any other mutant strategy. Recent studies have revealed that population structure can considerably affect evolutionary dynamics. Here we derive the conditions of evolutionary stability for games on graphs. We obtain analytical conditions for regular graphs of degree k > 2. Those theoretical predictions are compared with computer simulations for random regular graphs and for lattices. We study three different update rules: birth-death (BID), death-birth (DB), and imitation (IM) updating. Evolutionary stability on sparse graphs does not imply evolutionary stability in a well-mixed population, nor vice versa. We provide a geometrical interpretation of the ESS condition on graphs. (c) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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