期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 254, 期 4, 页码 843-849出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.07.010
关键词
Signaling; Game theory; Selection-mutation dynamics; Bifurcation
资金
- Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research
- Economic and Social Research Council [RES-538-28-1001] Funding Source: researchfish
In signaling games the replicator dynamics does not almost always converge to states of perfect communication. A significant portion of the state space converges to components of Nash equilibria that characterize states of partial communication. Since these components consist of non-hyperbolic rest points, the significance of this result will depend on the dynamic behavior of specific perturbations of the replicator equations. In this paper we study selection-mutation dynamics of signaling games, which may be considered as one plausible perturbation of the replicator dynamics. We find that the long term behavior of the dynamics depends on the mutation rates of senders and receivers and on the relevance of communication. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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