期刊
JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
卷 31, 期 3, 页码 129-137出版社
WILEY
DOI: 10.1016/j.jom.2013.01.001
关键词
Supply chain contracts; Fairness; Bounded rationality; Behavioral operations management
资金
- National Science Foundation [SES 0849054]
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Various contracts can be designed to coordinate a simple supplier-retailer channel, yet the contracts proposed in prior research and tested in a laboratory setting do not perform as standard theory predicts. The supplier, endowed with all bargaining power, can neither fully coordinate the channel nor extract all of the channel profit. We report on a sequence of laboratory experiments designed to separate possible causes of channel inefficiency. The three causes we consider are inequality aversion, bounded rationality, and incomplete information. It turns out that all three affect human behavior. Inequality aversion has by far the most explanatory power regarding retailers' behavior. Incomplete information about the retailer's degree of inequality aversion has the most explanatory power in regards to the suppliers' behavior. Bounded rationality affects both players, but is of secondary importance. (c) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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