期刊
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS
卷 47, 期 1, 页码 77-83出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.011
关键词
Raiffa solution; Non-cooperative foundation; Nash program; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Implementation; Solution based social choice rule
资金
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) [IRTG 1134/2]
This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two-person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1991) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form game G(s,d) is defined that has an infinity of weakly subgame perfect equilibria whose payoff vectors coincide with that of the sequential Raiffa solution of (S, d). Moreover all those equilibria share the same equilibrium path consisting of proposing the Raiffa solution and accepting it in the first stage of the game. By a modification of G(s,d) the analogous result is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. These results immediately extend to implementation of a sequential Raiffa (solution based) social choice rule in subgame perfect equilibrium. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据