期刊
JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
卷 24, 期 2, 页码 269-291出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s00145-010-9084-8
关键词
Side-Channel Analysis; Mutual Information Analysis; Masking Countermeasure; Higher-Order Attacks; Probability Density Estimation
资金
- BCRYPT of the Belgian State [P6/26]
- FWO [G.0300.07]
- European Commission [ICT-2007-216676]
- Walloon region
- K.U. Leuven-BOF
Mutual Information Analysis is a generic side-channel distinguisher that has been introduced at CHES 2008. It aims to allow successful attacks requiring minimum assumptions and knowledge of the target device by the adversary. In this paper, we compile recent contributions and applications of MIA in a comprehensive study. From a theoretical point of view, we carefully discuss its statistical properties and relationship with probability density estimation tools. From a practical point of view, we apply MIA in two of the most investigated contexts for side-channel attacks. Namely, we consider first-order attacks against an unprotected implementation of the DES in a full custom IC and second-order attacks against a masked implementation of the DES in an 8-bit microcontroller. These experiments allow to put forward the strengths and weaknesses of this new distinguisher and to compare it with standard power analysis attacks using the correlation coefficient.
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