期刊
JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT
卷 137, 期 4, 页码 284-293出版社
ASCE-AMER SOC CIVIL ENGINEERS
DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000286
关键词
Game theory; Holdup problem; Innovation; Project networks; Simulation models
资金
- National Science Foundation [0729253]
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie
- Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences [0729253] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
Subcontractor selection strategies used by contractors can significantly affect short-term project and long-term organizational success. Existing research on subcontractor selection strategy implicitly assumes that the evaluation of subcontractors depends on current conditions. We extend this perspective by integrating an agent-based simulation model with game theory to examine whether precontract partner selection strategies that do not consider subcontractor selection as a repeated game may lead to a version of the holdup problem. The holdup problem we investigate focuses on relationship-specific investments in learning after the introduction of an innovation or organizational change across a project network. A minimum total cost strategy may decelerate the rate of adaptation to an innovation or organizational change, thereby proving that the holdup problem can exist in project networks. The findings contribute to subcontractor selection strategy literature by simulating the impact of the holdup problem in project networks, distinguishing task interdependence as a moderating variable, and identifying that the minimum total cost strategy can be a suboptimal strategy for project networks adapting to systemic changes. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000286. (C) 2011 American Society of Civil Engineers.
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