期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
卷 42, 期 2, 页码 501-520出版社
SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0336-8
关键词
Decision choice; Bargaining; Conflict resolution; Counteroffer; Implementation
类别
资金
- University of York
A bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism is proposed to solve a fundamental two-person decision choice problem with two alternatives. It yields a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, and leads to an intuitive overall solution that offers a reconciliation between egalitarianism and utilitarianism. We then investigate the axiomatic foundation of the solution. Furthermore, we compare it with several conventional strategic approaches to this setting.
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