4.7 Article

Strategic Social Team Crowdsourcing: Forming a Team of Truthful Workers for Crowdsourcing in Social Networks

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING
卷 18, 期 6, 页码 1419-1432

出版社

IEEE COMPUTER SOC
DOI: 10.1109/TMC.2018.2860978

关键词

Mechanism design; crowdsourcing; team formation; social networks

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61472079, 61170164, 61807008, 61806053, 61472089, U1501254]
  2. Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province of China [BK20171363]
  3. National Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province [U1501254]
  4. Science and Technology Planning Project of Guangdong Province [2015B010131015, 2015B010108006]
  5. Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province [2014A030308008]
  6. Guangdong Regular University International and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan Cooperative Innovation Platform and International Cooperation Major Projects [2015KGJHZ023]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

With the increasing complexity of tasks that are crowdsourced, requesters need to formteams of professionalworkers that can satisfy complex task skill requirements. Teamcrowdsourcing in social networks (SNs) provides a promising solution for complex task crowdsourcing, where the requester hires a teamof professionalworkers that are also socially connected can work together collaboratively. Previous social teamformation approaches havemainly focused on the algorithmic aspect for social welfaremaximization; however, within the traditional objective of maximizing social welfare alone, selfish workers can manipulate the crowdsourcing market by behaving untruthfully. This dishonest behavior discourages other workers from participating and is unprofitable for the requester. To address this strategic social team crowdsourcing problem, truthful mechanisms are developed to guarantee that a worker's utility is optimized when he behaves honestly. This problem is proved to NP-hard, and two efficient mechanisms are proposed to optimize social welfare while reducing time complexity for different scale applications. For small-scale applications where the task requires a small number of skills, a binary tree network is first extracted from the social network, and a dynamic programming-based optimal team is formed in the binary tree. For large-scale applications where the task requires a large number of skills, a team is formed greedily based on the workers' social structure, skill, and working cost. For both mechanisms, the threshold payment rule, which pays each worker his marginal value for task completion, is proposed to elicit truthfulness. Finally, the experimental results of a real-world dataset show that compared to the benchmark exponential VCG truthful mechanism, the proposed small-scale-oriented mechanism can reduce computation time while producing nearly the same social welfare results. Furthermore, compared to other state-of-the-art polynomial heuristics, the proposed large-scale-oriented mechanism can achieve truthfulness while generating better social welfare outcomes.

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