期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY
卷 55, 期 10, 页码 4598-4607出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TIT.2009.2027577
关键词
Correlated jamming; eavesdropping; mutual information games; wireless multiuser security; zero-sum games
We investigate the behavior of two users and one jammer in an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with and without fading when they participate in a noncooperative zero-sum game, with the channel's input/output mutual information as the objective function. We assume that the jammer can eavesdrop on the channel and can use the information obtained to perform correlated jamming. We also differentiate between the availability of perfect and noisy information about the user signals at the jammer. Under various assumptions on the channel characteristics, and the extent of information available at the users and the jammer, we show the existence, or otherwise nonexistence of a simultaneously optimal set of strategies for the users and the jammer, and characterize those strategies whenever they exist.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据