期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS I-REGULAR PAPERS
卷 58, 期 3, 页码 595-606出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TCSI.2010.2073852
关键词
Chaos; convolutional code; cryptography; error correction
资金
- Innovation and Technology Commission [GHP/048/08]
- Research Grants Council, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [RPC07/08.EG22]
This paper evaluates the security of the generalized chaotic convolutional coder, which is a recently proposed joint error-correction and encryption scheme integrating the chaotic encryption into the convolutional coding. Our results show that the probability of fully recovering the pseudorandom sequence (PRS) controlling the chaotic switches is at least 0.289 under known-plaintext attack, if the number of available plaintext/ciphertext pairs p is equal to the constraint length k of the chaotic convolutional coder. In the case that p = k + e, where e is an element of Z(+), we prove that the probability to fully deduce the PRS is lower bounded by 1 - 2(-e). Furthermore, we propose four types of chosen-plain.text attack with different decoding complexities and efficiencies to fully derive the PRS.
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