Defense against primary user emulation attacks in cognitive radio networks

Cognitive Radio (CR) is a promising technology that can alleviate the spectrum shortage problem by enabling unlicensed users equipped with CRs to coexist with incumbent users in licensed spectrum bands while causing no interference to incumbent communications. Spectrum sensing is one of the essential mechanisms of CRs and its operational aspects are being investigated actively. However, the security aspects of spectrum sensing have garnered little attention. In this paper, we identify a threat to spectrum sensing, which we call the primary user emulation (PUE) attack. In this attack, an adversary's CR transmits signals whose characteristics emulate those of incumbent signals. The highly flexible, software-based air interface of CRs makes such an attack possible. Our investigation shows that a PUE attack can severely interfere with the spectrum sensing process and significantly reduce the channel resources available to legitimate unlicensed users. To counter this threat, we propose a transmitter verification scheme, called LocDef (localization-based defense), which verifies whether a given signal is that of an incumbent transmitter by estimating its location and observing its signal characteristics. To estimate the location of the signal transmitter, LocDef employs a non-interactive localization scheme. Our security analysis and simulation results suggest that LocDef is effective in identifying PUE attacks under certain conditions.