Journal
EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL B
Volume 71, Issue 4, Pages 579-585Publisher
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2009-00160-1
Keywords
-
Categories
Funding
- Hungarian National Research Fund [73449]
- COST P10
Ask authors/readers for more resources
We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available