Journal
ENERGY
Volume 162, Issue -, Pages 505-516Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2018.07.209
Keywords
Renewable portfolio standard; Tradable green certificates; Behavior strategies; Evolutionary game
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Funding
- Beijing Municipal Social Science Foundation [16JDYJB031]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [2018ZD14, 2017XS112, 2017X5107]
- 111 Project [B18021]
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Renewable portfolio standard (RPS) plays a significant role in developing renewable energy. This study developed an evolution game model of power producers to analyze the symbiotic evolution between RPS and the electric producers' behavior strategies, and discuss the impacts of the key institutional parameters on the dynamic evolution process of electric producers. To verify the theoretical results, simulation experiments and sensitivity analysis were conducted with meaningful results: Trading Tradable Green certificates (TGC) could become the common belief of all power producers, with the scientific design of institutional parameters. An optimal quota, higher unit fine, lower transaction cost and marginal cost difference of green and thermal power contribute to improving the effectiveness of RPS. This study could provide some scientific recommendations for government to design and construct RPS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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