Journal
ECONOMETRICA
Volume 77, Issue 5, Pages 1607-1636Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA7384
Keywords
Social image; audience effects; signaling; dictator game; altruism
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [SES-0551296, SES-0452300]
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A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments. both In the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game). many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider :in alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to lie perceived its fair The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments
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