Journal
ECOLOGY LETTERS
Volume 14, Issue 12, Pages 1300-1312Publisher
WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01697.x
Keywords
Coevolution; common-pool resource; cooperation; game theory; host sanctions; mutualism; N-person prisoner's dilemma; public goods; symbiosis; volunteer's dilemma
Categories
Funding
- National Science Foundation [SES-0750480]
- European Science Foundation/European Collaborative Research (ESF/EURO-CORES)
- OTKA Hungary [T049692, NN71700]
- European Union, Yunnan Province [20080A001]
- Chinese Academy of Sciences [0902281081, KSCX2-YW-Z-1027, Y002731079]
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)
- UK Medical Research Council [G0801721]
- University of East Anglia
- European Science Foundation
- United States National Science Foundation
- Medical Research Council [G0801721] Funding Source: researchfish
- MRC [G0801721] Funding Source: UKRI
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We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.
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