Journal
COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Volume 41, Issue -, Pages 374-385Publisher
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.cor.2013.07.010
Keywords
Game theory; Bilevel optimization; Stackelberg games; Multi-leader-follower problem; Evolutionary algorithm
Categories
Funding
- Academy of Finland [13133387]
- Liikesivistysrahasto and HSE Foundation
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the other. Despite a number of studies on handling bilevel optimization problems, these problems still remain a challenging territory, and existing methodologies are able to handle only simple problems with few variables under assumptions of continuity and differentiability. In this paper, we consider a special case of a multi-period multi-leader-follower Stackelberg competition model with non-linear cost and demand functions and discrete production variables. The model has potential applications, for instance in aircraft manufacturing industry, which is an oligopoly where a few giant firms enjoy a tremendous commitment power over the other smaller players. We solve cases with different number of leaders and followers, and show how the entrance or exit of a player affects the profits of the other players. In the presence of various model complexities, we use a computationally intensive nested evolutionary strategy to find an optimal solution for the model. The strategy is evaluated on a test-suite of bilevel problems, and it has been shown that the method is successful in handling difficult bilevel problems. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available