4.7 Article

Tradeable carbon permit auctions - How and why to auction not grandfather

Journal

ENERGY POLICY
Volume 30, Issue 4, Pages 333-345

Publisher

ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00100-8

Keywords

tradeable carbon permits; grandfathering; climate change; auctions

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An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, natural gas liquid sellers. and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets. permits would be fully tradable and bank-able. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation. and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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