Journal
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Volume 113, Issue 484, Pages 128-146Publisher
BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00087
Keywords
-
Categories
Ask authors/readers for more resources
Using a sample of Japanese firms in the chemical industry, we show that concentrated shareholding is associated with lower expenditure on activities with scope for managerial private benefits. We interpret this as evidence of a hitherto undocumented form of monitoring by large shareholders. We examine whether such monitoring is also performed by banks and other creditors. The results in the metal product industry are roughly similar, but we find no evidence of this type of monitoring in the Japanese electronics industry, and suggest a number of explanations.
Authors
I am an author on this paper
Click your name to claim this paper and add it to your profile.
Reviews
Recommended
No Data Available