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Volume 101, Issue 2, Pages 443-465Publisher
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DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.04.009
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Against a background of recent progress in developmental neuroscience, some of which has been taken as challenging to the modularity hypothesis of Fodor (1983), this article contrasts two competing conceptions of modularity: sui generis modularity, according to which modules are treated as independent neurocognitive entities that owe nothing to one another, and descent-with-modification modularity, according to which current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. I argue that sui generis modularity is incompatible with a range of data, from the co-occurrence of deficits to the patterns of activation in neuroimaging studies, but that same range of data is compatible with descent-with-modification modularity. Furthermore, I argue that the latter conception of modularity may have important implications for the practice and conception of fields such as developmental disorders and linguistics. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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