Journal
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
Volume 73, Issue 1, Pages 1-30Publisher
BLACKWELL PUBLISHING
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00367.x
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We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986); agents supply labour and trade risk-free claims to future consumption. subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics-an agent's accumulated stock of claims. or wealth. and her current labour income. We show that optimal taxes are generally non-linear and non-separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences.
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