Journal
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Volume 74, Issue 1, Pages 30-55Publisher
PHILOSOPHY PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00002.x
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I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief;, that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that the demand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair or question-begging one.
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