Journal
MARINE RESOURCE ECONOMICS
Volume 22, Issue 2, Pages 137-154Publisher
UNIV CHICAGO PRESS
DOI: 10.1086/mre.22.2.42629549
Keywords
Baltic Sea cod; characteristic function; coalition game; cooperation; fisheries; nucleolus; Shapley value; sharing rules; stability of cooperation
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This paper examines cooperative sharing rules in fisheries coalition games and develops a new sharing rule that takes into account the stability of cooperation when externalities are present. We contribute to existing knowledge by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stability). As an illustrative example, we describe a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model of the major agents who exploit the cod stock in the Baltic Sea.
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