Journal
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Volume 62, Issue 1, Pages 67-76Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.005
Keywords
volunteer's dilemma; public goods; evolution; equilibrium selection; quantal response
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A public good is produced if and only if a volunteer provides it. There are many pure-strategy Nash equilibria in each of which a single player volunteers. Noisy strategy revisions (for instance, quantal responses) allow play to evolve. Equilibrium selection is achieved via the characterisation of long-run play as revisions approximate best replies. The volunteer need not be the lowest-cost player: relatively high-cost, but nonetheless reliable players may instead produce the public good. More efficient players provide when higher values are associated with lower costs. Voluntary open-source software provision offers a contemporary application. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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