Journal
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION
Volume 18, Issue 2, Pages 561-564Publisher
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2009.01.003
Keywords
Access consciousness; Phenomenal consciousness; Reflective consciousness unconscious; SDT; Exclusion
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Access can either be first-order or second-order. First order access concerns whether contents achieve representation in phenomenal consciousness at all; second-order access concerns whether phenomenally conscious contents are selected for metacognitive, higher order processing by reflective consciousness. When the optional and flexible nature of second-order access is kept in mind, there remain strong reasons to believe that exclusion failure can indeed isolate phenomenally conscious stimuli that are not so accessed. Irvine's [Irvine, E. (2009). Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness-Evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction? Consciousness and Cognition] partial access argument fails because exclusion failure is indeed due to lack of second-order access, not insufficient phenomenally conscious information. Further, the enable account conforms with both qualitative differences and subjective report, and is simpler than the endow account. Finally, although first-order access may be a distinct and important process, second-order access arguably reflects the core meaning of access generally. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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