Journal
PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Volume 60, Issue 238, Pages 109-125Publisher
WILEY-BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, INC
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.604.x
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A not unpopular position in the metaphysics of material objects (Ted Sider's, for instance) combines realism about what objects there are and the conditions of objecthood with conventionalism about de re modality. I argue that this is not a coherent combination of views: one must go fully conventionalist, or fully realist. The central argument displays the difficulty for the modal conventionalist/object realist in specifying the object that satisfies de re modal predicates. I argue that if this is a mind-independent object, contradictions arise when we consider the possibility or actuality of non-equivalent conventions both applying to 'the same object'.
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